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ABSTRACT There has been vigorous debate on how different countries responded to the COVID-19. To 
secure public safety, Korea has actively used personal information at the risk of personal privacy whereas 
France encourages voluntary cooperation at the risk of public safety. In this article, we examine the pros 
and cons of these two different approaches in epidemiological investigations. In addition, we present 
technological options of de-identification of personal information in the course of managing this pandemic 
under control. We discuss lessons for future research and policy implications. 
  
INDEX TERMS Personal Privacy, Public Safety, COVID-19, Pandemic, Infectious Diseases, Policy, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Increasingly, integration of big data and ICT promises 
enormous benefits to societal value creation. At the same 
time, concerns about privacy breaches in the context of big 
data usage are timely and relevant. The “old” debate over 
personal privacy and public security is not over. In a 
pandemic crisis, public safety is a top priority. This means 
that if a government pursues a legitimate use of certain 
information for the compelling public purpose, privacy rights 
may be at risk [1, 2, 3]. In particular, when personal 
information is crucial to control pandemic crisis such as 
COVID-19, “implicit” consent is more likely to be expected. 
In the early 1980s, privacy and confidentiality was 
generally accepted standard on any epidemiological studies 
[4, 5]. For a face-to-face investigation, the main focus was to 
achieve specific research goals ensuring the personal privacy. 
However, in view of increasing social costs associated with 
prevention, treatment and compensation of serious infectious 
diseases, there was a growing demand for accurate 
information in pursuit of potentially disastrous public health 
risks.  For an example, Gilbert Beebe suggested that 
gathering accurate information for public interest might be a 
higher priority over privacy issues [7]. The widespread flu 
epidemic in 2009 again provided additional support for this 
line of reasoning. In the course of using personal information 
for epidemiological investigations, individual's explicit 
consent was not always obtained. In the United States, Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) has 
established the privacy rules that set limits on the use and 
disclosure of any personal health information without the 
patient's approval [8]. At the same time, aggregating personal 
information for public health purpose was a somewhat 
different matter [9]. 
COVID-19 is an extraordinary circumstance that almost 
the whole society is lockdown because of enormous public 
health risks—anticipating potentially millions or more deaths 
of people worldwide [10, 11, 12]. Nations are at war with 
corona virus. In this context, what does it mean to balance 
between personal privacy and public safety? What are the 
proper boundaries and acceptable norms? This paper aims to 
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consider these questions and examine 
actual cases of two countries—Korea 
and France.  The subsequent sections 
of this paper are organized in the 
following order. In section 2 we 
discuss characteristics of the virus that 
causes COVID-19.  We then 
introduce an anti-displacement 
alternative to COVID-19. We further 
compare the results of the French 
government's and Korean 
government's quarantine measures 
against COVID-19. The subsequent 
risk analysis uses STRIDE threat 
modeling for the Korean 
government's quarantine system. 
After discussing the necessity of de-
identification of personal information 
and de-identification technologies, we 
present lessons and implications for 
future epidemiological investigations. 
II. COVID-19 RESPONSES 
A new type of corona virus (SARS-CoV-2) was first reported 
in Wuhan, China in December 2019. Since then, this 
respiratory infection epidemic, designated as COVID-19, has 
spread throughout China and around the world. Upon 
infection, after 2 to 14 days of incubation period, the 
respiratory symptoms include high fever (about 37.5 degrees) 
and cough or dyspnea. However, it is estimated that there are 
a number of cases of asymptomatic infections with the 
disease without these symptoms.  On January 21, 2020, the 
Chinese government officially reported the possibility of 
human infection in COVID-19 with the 15 confirmed cases. 
The medical staff involved incident became a credible 
evidence of human-to-human transmission [13]. On January 
30th, 2020, World Health Organization (WHO) declared the 
continual spread of this infection as International Public 
Health Emergency (PHEIC). With an accelerating rate of 
confirmed patients around the globe, on March 11, 2020 
WHO declared this corona virus epidemic as pandemic as it 
did regarding the Hong Kong Flu (1968) and H1N1 (2009) 
[14]. 
COVID-19 is a respiratory virus which spreads primarily 
through droplets generated when an infected person coughs 
or sneezes, or through droplets of saliva or discharge from 
the nose. The infected patient's saliva can be transmitted 
directly to another person’s eye or if their eyes are rubbed 
with a virus-contaminated hand [13]. And the rapid 
propagation power of COVID-19 was expected to inevitably 
lead to a shortage of limited medical equipment and facilities 
due to an sudden increase in the number of explosive patients 
within a short period of time [15]. For these reasons, the fight 
against COVID-19 requires confinement of confirmed and 
contacted persons, especially in the early days of quarantine. 
In some countries, these responses were compulsory, while 
others were left to autonomy. Our study compared the cases 
of France and South Korea with special focus on their 
government’s approaches in seeking the participation of their 
citizens.  
A. Korean Government’s Approach 
At the beginning the Korean government did not responded 
appropriately due to the lack of understanding of the 
characteristics of COVID-19. The initial optimism was based 
on the confidence in Korea's medical capabilities to handle 
public health challenges. In particular, the confusion was 
about how to determine a specific level to quarantine those 
who could be suspected of being asymptomatic. For example, 
a Chinese woman who arrived from Wuhan on January 20 
was found to be the first confirmed case, but until then, if 
fever symptoms were not present, immigrants were allowed 
to enter and therefore the system did not follow through 
asymptomatic patients. 
However, after understanding the epidemiologic 
significance of asymptomatic patients and the nature of 
droplet infection, the  new emphasis was to  identify the 
pathogens of the confirmed patients and isolating contacts in 
close contact with the pathogens. This represents the 
essential elements of Disease Health Integration System 
(DHIMS) which collects and uses epidemiological survey 
data, referring to Figure 1. Local governments conduct tests 
for epidemiologic investigation. Medical staff at public 
health centers and diagnostic screening centers follow-up 
with the confirmed patients. Local governments are 
responsible to operate screening clinics through large scale of 
drive-through or walk-through testing  sites without 
harvesting virus transmission [16]. 
In case when a person is confirmed with a test positive, the 
health center or diagnostic center immediately uploads the 
Figure 1. Disease Health Integrated Management System for COVID-19 is shown. 
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relevant personal information of the confirmed to the 
DHIMS. At the same time, the health center or diagnostic 
center immediately informs the incident to the Centers for 
Disease Control (KCDC). The local government health 
center also conducts additional epidemiological 
investigations. Confirmed patients are required by law to 
disclose the recent moving paths and identify all the 
contacted persons. Using the mobile phones and credit cards 
of the confirmed patients, local governments upload all 
contact information to DHIMS including name, address, 
contact information, date of birth, gender, disease name, 
diagnosis date, age, occupation, place of residence, telephone 
number, and medical information. Also, for virus prevention 
and containment, the epidemiological investigation list 
includes all the relevant information of the contacted--name, 
address, contact information, date of birth, and health status. 
In this way, a national database of epidemiological 
investigations gather all the relevant information of the 
confirmed and all the contacted. 
The Korean government uses this database of 
epidemiological investigations to isolate confirmed persons 
and all the contacted. Diagnosis test is performed 
immediately among those who have symptoms. According to 
the severity of the symptoms of COVID-19, the people are 
either self-contained or hospitalized. Those who do not have 
any symptoms among the contacts are quarantined for 14 
days from the contact date of the confirmed person. Self-
quarantined individuals are monitored daily at local 
government call centers. The additional diagnostic test. result 
shows that the person is negative and after 14 days without 
symptoms, he/she is to be released.    
The Korean government implements the COVID-19 
response system with 3P (Preemptive, Prompt, and Precise). 
3T (Trace, Test, Treatment) plus P (Participation) quarantine 
response model [16]. It covers diagnosis to testing, 
epidemiology, tracing, and citizen participation. It uses 
innovative ICT systems such as self-isolation and diagnostic 
apps, drive-through and walking-through clinics and mobile 
phone location information analysis. The Korean government 
also counts on voluntary  participation of citizens in 
developing additional resources from the database. For 
example, using these aggregated epidemiological survey 
databases, real time corona maps and monitoring apps are 
developed for the benefits of society at large. 
B. France Government’s Response 
France organized Public Health France (PHF) on January 13, 
2020 to monitor and respond to the COVID-19 epidemic. 
PHF’s Crisis Center is responsible for coordination of 
monitoring epidemiological prevention, mobilizing health 
protection organizations, managing strategic resources of 
medical facilities, and offering support services. PHF 
conducts daily epidemiological investigations and released 
the aggregate details including the area,  gender and age 
group of COVID-19 [17, 18]. 
PHF sets the surveillance system to monitor  
epidemiological and clinical aspects of COVID-19, using  
urban medicine, measuring the severity of the epidemic and 
its impact on the medical system, and the fatality rate. PHF  
actively takes preventative measures to limit the spread of 
COVID-19. They aim to reduce the risk of transmission 
among people through preventive messages to the people in 
the affected area. In addition, precautionary measures are to 
assist people to a better quality of life  even in social isolation. 
In addition, PHF supports active health-related services by 
operating a remote support system. PHF allows healthcare 
professionals (doctors, nurses, pharmacists, physical 
therapists, midwives, etc.) and health professionals 
(managers, supervisors, health facility personnel, and 
engineers) to stay ready for the health center's request for 
help. The COVID-19 certainly disrupts French ways of life, 
restricts economic activities and affects social behaviors. The 
French government has implemented quarantine measures 
since March 16, 2020. PHF also monitors behavioral and 
mental health practices in response to these changes, and 
assesses anxiety levels.  From the early days of the outbreak, 
PHF’s main challenge is how to mobilize citizen 
participation in the fight against COVID-19. 
C. Comparisons between France and Korea 
According to WHO data, the date of the first confirmed case 
in Korea was January 20, 2020. In France it was January 24, 
2020 when there was the first confirmed case. In both 
countries, COVID-19 was introduced at the same week. 
However, after little more than two months, there is a marked 
difference in the cumulative confirmed cases and deaths of 
the two countries [14]. 
 
 
Figure 2. It shows the comparison of the cumulative number of 
confirmed cases and the number of deaths between Korea and France 
according to the COVID-19 response. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the cumulative # of confirmed in 
Korea is 10, 537 and in France is 95,403. The cumulative 
deaths in Korea are 147  and in France are 14,393. As for the 
ratio of deaths to confirmed persons, Korea is 1.39 and 
France is 15.08. A simple comparison of the confirmed and 
mortality rates is significantly higher in France than in Korea. 
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At the rate of confirmers per 1,000 populations, Korea is 
0.204, while France is 1.374. 
 
Figure 3. It shows the comparison of mortality rates between Korea and 
France according to the COVID-19 response. 
 
TABLE 1 
NUMBER OF CONFIRMED, DEATHS, RATE OF DEATHS AND CP/1,000  
 
Figure 3 and Table 1 shows that the outcomes of the 
KCDC’s responses is different that of France's PHF. The 
Korean government’s active preventive measures include the 
usage of the epidemiological investigation database and ICT. 
Both countries encouraged their citizens to join in  the 
fight against COVID-19. However, there are significant 
differences in their outcomes.  Our research suggests the  
epidemiological investigation database and the ICT 
technology usage in Korea have resulted in enormous 
benefits. This do not mean that any country can adopt the 
Korean government's approaches without any difficulty.   
III. SECURITY OF KOREAN RESPONSE SYSTEM 
It is not a goal of this research to fully describe the 
development processes of the Korean government's 
quarantine system and its operational mechanisms. For the 
purpose of this research we used available response 
guidelines released by the Korean government and other 
related announcement and analyzed the security threat using 
the STRIDE analysis technique on the reconstructed 
quarantine system [19, 20].  We examined the relevant data 
from the Korean government's epidemiological database 
using the STRIDE  analysis modeling. 
A. Threat Analysis using STRIDE 
We performed the security evaluation by the STRIDE 
threat modeling and examined the dynamic investigation 
data input and output of the Disease Health Integration 
System (DHIMS) [16, 21]. 
 
 
Figure 4. Data vulnerabilities for the system are shown. 
 
Table 2 is a summary that explains the various types of 
threat type and threat level according to DHIMS system 
access level. 
 
TABLE 2 
 THREAT TYPE AND THREAT LEVEL 
Threat Type Threat Level 
Spoofing Identity System Access Level 
Tampering Data Input of epidemiological investigation 
data: Any change can be made by 
medical personnel or epidemiologists 
Repudiation System Access Level 
Information Disclosure System Access Level 
Epidemiological investigation data: 
privacy data, raw data 
Providing epidemiological survey data 
to the government and the private sector 
Denial of Service System Access Level 
Elevation of Privilege System Access Level 
 
Spoofing Identity: The appropriate security level of the 
DHIMS system requires safeguarding identity and  restricting 
access to epidemiological investigation data, referring to 
Figure 4. After performing the basic authentication operation 
procedures, the relevant medical personnel, epidemiologists, 
government agencies, or civilians are allowed to get access 
the epidemiological investigation database. 
Tempering Data: The epidemiological data collected 
contain personal information in detail: name, address, contact 
information, gender, age, and phone number of the 
confirmer/ all contacted. DHIMS does not automatically de-
identify such epidemiological survey data. At the time of  
entering epidemiological survey data, medical personnel or 
epidemiologists may arbitrarily change epidemiological 
survey data arbitrarily. 
Repudiation: Since a legitimate user can handle both the 
input and output of epidemiological survey data to and from 
DHIMS, there may not be sufficient correct and check 
procedure in the processing data operation. Medical/ 
mechanical investigators may not be held accountable if they 
arbitrarily change epidemiological investigation data. The 
Date(2020.04.13) KR FR 
Accumulative 10,537 95,403 
Deaths 147 14,393 
Rate of Deaths 1.39 15.08 
CP per 1000 0.204 1.374 
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results of epidemiological investigations in an offline state do 
not always match exactly with the epidemiological data 
entered in an online state. Therefore, ensuring integrity of the 
epidemiological investigation data is a real challenge. 
Information Disclosure: The retention period for 
epidemiological data in DHIMS is permanent or semi-
permanent. If systematic security of DHIMS is solid, then all  
personal information is assumed to be kept safe. However, a 
third party requests particular set of epidemiological 
investigation data, DHIMS is supposed to conduct de-
identification process and offer specific numbers instead of 
names [21]. However, it is also possible  the privacy of 
individuals might not always be respected.  
Quality Control Measures: DHIMS use quality control 
measures which access permission and denial based on 
relevant parameters (e.g., proper authorization and 
examination of  usage patterns). 
DHIMS has issues related to the overall system security 
level because epidemiological survey data contain 
identifiable personal information. This may potentially lead 
to serious privacy violations of all those who are required to 
provide multiple aspects of personal information. Despite its 
effective response to COVID-19 using epidemiological 
survey data, the entire process is also embedded with serious 
potential privacy violation.  Even more problematic is the 
fact that the retention period of  these epidemiological 
investigation data is legally permanent or semi-permanent 
[21]. Unless strict safeguarding measures are in operation,  
there remains serous privacy risk concerns. 
B. Public Safety vs. Personal Privacy 
The Korean government disclosed the COVID-19 
confirmatory movement path, the address of quarantined 
building, and enforced two weeks of self-containment for all 
the confirmed and contacted. In the early days of the endemic 
outbreak, corona maps tracked the path of the confirmer and 
thus raised awareness of many people.  
With the rapid increase of the confirmed persons from 
Shincheonji church congregation, the nature of public safety 
needed a better definition. Shincheonji church, in good faith, 
provided the personal information of its members to the 
Korean government that guaranteed strict protection of 
personal information. Shincheonji local branch provided 
social security number and phone number of each member. 
The Korean government followed up the Figure 5 shows a 
comparison of cumulative deaths in Korea and France. The 
number of deaths before and after the Pandemic, declared on 
March 11, shows a sharp difference. There seems high 
correlations between the usage of big data that contains 
personal information and effectiveness of epidemiological 
investigations in this pandemic situation.  In an extraordinary 
crisis situation—COVID-19 pandemic, unidentified  
aggregate information has no value. For public safety, the 
government had to use a huge church big data that provides 
identifiable personal information. members of Shincheonji 
church with phone calls and  conducted investigations for 
their the COVID-19 related visits and contacts.  
Confirmed # 31 is a member of Shincheonji church. The 
third confirmed person also received much social attention. 
Public safety requires “right to know” about the status of 
coronavirus infection. In the age of digital age, balancing the 
public safety and personal privacy is enormously challenging 
[22, 23, 24]. Individuals may waive their privacy rights for 
public safety that requires informing people about relevant 
coronavirus infection information. The question are, “What is 
relevant?  How much details are allowed to be openly 
available to public?”  
C. Example of Using Big Data in Pandemic 
In the early stage of the outbreak, the Korean government 
collected the personal information of confirmed patients to 
prevent further infection. The use of personal information- is 
essential for the prevention of occupational diseases. The 
privacy problem described above may not be how it will be 
developed in the current process. 
The Korean government specified the path of infection, 
identified all the contacted persons, conducted disaster 
prevention and implemented self-containment of the contact 
person. The details of patient's personal information included 
credit cards, phone number, and address. The initial response 
of the Korean government had a considerable effect with 
moderate success.  
     On February 18, 2020, there was the 31st confirmed 
person in a Shincheonji church in Daegu area. With a sudden 
increase of confirmed patients among Shincheonji church 
members, the Korean government changed its approach to 
more aggressive follow-up.  Shincheonji church, as a new 
religious movement, was not yet accepted as a part of 
mainstream religions in Korea. Hundreds of the church 
leaders attended their international missionary outreach 
gathering in Wuhan, China and returned back to Korea in 
January, 2020.  At the request of the Korean government 
Shincheonji Church provided social security number and 
phone number of its members. Local governments called the 
church member in their region and examined the symptoms 
and conducted corona tests. As a result, almost all of the 
Shincheonji church members (about 212,000) have been 
examined. In the meantime, the number of confirmed persons 
has increased explosively—up to 7,513 on March 10, 2020 
[25].  
      The Shincheonji church ledger is a  big data of more than 
200,000 people. Korean government used this big data to 
prevent COVID-19 pandemic. Their methods of recruitment 
of new members and education of its members have 
controversial elements. In particular, their regular mass 
meeting often occurred in an enclosed huge hall. Considering 
the situation in which virus transmission is easy due to the 
characteristics of the church contacting in an enclosed space.  
With the use of this church big data and follow-up testing, 
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one of the main sources of widespread outbreak was 
effectively contained.  
 
 
    Figure 5. Comparison of cumulative deaths in Korea and France [26] 
 
Although the personal information issue of big data has 
been raised before, it’s real challenges actually occur in 
Korea in the contest of COVID-19. Public safety and 
personal privacy are two important value pillars related to 
use of information through Big Data. One way to balance 
public safety and personal privacy might be using de-
identified information. 
D. De-identification in epidemiological investigation 
As a proactive measure for pandemic containment and 
prevention, the Korean government uses  epidemiological 
data through ICT technology. Medical testing equipment 
expedited massive coronavirus testing which was 
instrumental in reducing mortality. It is public safety 
imperative to use  personal information to  control and 
prevent the spread of pandemic. Managing personal 
information stored in big data requires  appropriate privacy 
protection measures.  
It is one thing to use raw data at the initial stage of 
quarantine and quite another to  manage huge volume of 
personal information as big-identified data. Privacy violation 
is related to the use of identifiable personal information.  
Therefore, serious privacy issues can be effectively handled 
with non-identifiable personal information. Right type of 
technology is needed to implement such de-identification 
options.  
In the United States, Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPPA) set national standards for 
protecting an individual's medical records and their personal 
health information. It applies to health plans, health care 
information centers, and health care providers that 
electronically transmit any health care transactions. This rule 
requires appropriate safeguards to protect the privacy of 
personal health information and sets limits and specifies  
conditions for the use and disclosure of such information 
without patient consent and approval [9, 27].  
However, the Korean government uses identifiable 
personal information with limited restrictions, leading to 
possible serious violations of privacy related to confirmed 
persons /all those contacted.  Securing personal information 
in quarantine measures is appropriate. In respect to personal 
privacy, it is important to use the information gathered for 
the specific intended purpose only. Using identifiable 
personal information  for some other purposes is breach of 
confidence and trust. Moreover, legal provision of keeping  
quarantine investigation data either in permanent or semi-
permanent period is not reasonable at all. Requiring de-
identification of personal information and rapid deployment 
relevant technology is urgently in need.  
IV. ENHANSED SECURITY IN EPIDEMIOGICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 
In the privacy rules of HIPAA, two approaches are proposed 
regarding the de-identification of personal health 
information: the safe harbor method and the expert 
determination method [27]. The safe harbor method deletes 
18 personal identification variables such as name, social 
security number, contact information, IP address, fingerprint, 
photo, and detailed address. The method of using experts is 
to processing personal information in non-identifying  
algorithms. 
The release and forget model, the data use agreement 
(DUA) model, and the enclave model are all useful to 
achieve effective control in data storage and usage processes. 
The general pre-sale model is to release unidentified personal 
information to the public by posting data on the Internet. In 
this way, once personal information is disclosed, it is almost 
impossible for any institution to recover it. The data usage 
agreement model is usually a method of proactively 
negotiating, linking to other information, or prohibiting 
information redistribution in advance, or controlling it with a 
user click-through license agreement on the Internet. The 
closed room model maintains a kind of closed room (analytic 
environment in which physical access, network, etc. is 
blocked) that restricts the export of unidentified personal 
information original information and instead allows qualified 
researchers to inquire and analyses for desirable results. It is 
a physical and technical control method to respond and 
export [28]. 
It is not easy to preserve the scientific utilization value of 
the collected data and de-identify personal information at the 
same time.  These two factors are in conflict with each other. 
In other words, researchers look for more precise analysis 
results using the original data that contain a minimum de-
identification level of personal information. On the other 
hand, any institutions that provide the data aim to satisfy 
personal privacy requirements by ensuring the anonymity of 
the data. 
There are diverse approaches of de-identification of 
personal information. An increasing level of de-identification 
is negatively related to the quality of the data and the 
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precision of the research results. Conversely, higher data 
quality and outcome precision requires lower level of de-
identification. A greater level of personal identification is 
related to a higher possibility of privacy infringement. 
Then, how can epidemiological investigators de-identify 
personal information to ensure personal privacy? The 
primary purpose of the epidemiological investigation  is to 
minimize the contacts with the confirmed patient. For this 
reason, isolation of a corona virus test positive individual is 
imperative in the prevention and spread of infectious diseases.  
Here are several practical suggestions to enhance security 
in the epidemiological investigations: 
First, the consent to use personal information is obtained at 
the time of epidemiological investigations. Such permission 
will specify the period of storage and use of personal 
information. Because of the extraordinary nature of COVID-
19, in the early breakout period personal information was 
often collected without getting proper consent. Later, it is 
mandatory to obtain personal information consent. If any 
individuals are reluctant to give their content, the personal 
information used in the epidemiological investigation is  
immediately deleted.  
Second, there are other options for the proper use of 
identifiable personal information. It is worth considering 
concepts such as copyright payment. For sales of any product 
with copyright the corresponding amount of money is set 
aside to compensate the copyright holder. If complete de-
identification of personal information is not possible, it is 
plausible to compensate each individual for the use of their  
personal information. In addition, epidemiological 
investigations can be done either offline or online. In all these 
investigation, getting consent from individuals that 
participate is a must.  
Third, a medical person or epidemiologist personal store 
the personal information collected offline in the system by 
applying de-identification technology. When the required 
information is uploaded in the system, it is notified to the 
individual for accuracy and consent. Afterward, the offline 
information is immediately destroyed. The fact is 
communicated to the individual as well.  
Fourth, personal information collected online will be 
stored in the system by applying de-identification technology 
by epidemiologists. When the personal information collected 
in the system is uploaded, the fact is  immediately notified to 
the individual. 
Fifth, if third parties have to receive personal information 
of individuals collected by epidemiological investigations, 
the system immediately notifies them of this fact. At this 
time, the personal information that is made available to third 
party is in the form of non-identifying numbers of symbols.  
Sixth, the third party may need to re-identify the 
unidentified personal information as necessary. At this time, 
the third party must immediately communicate the individual 
of the re-identification need  and obtain the consent of the 
individual. If an individual's consent is not obtained, personal 
information must be immediately destroyed.   
With widely available de-identification technologies, it is 
difficult to prevent individuals from being re-identified from 
de-identification measures. Researchers including Montjoye  
of Imperial College London, UK, conducted experiments 
with published data from the United States, Turkey, etc., and 
found certain attributes accurately even by using  de-
identified data [29]. Their machine learning model could 
identify individuals with 99.98% accuracy from any 
anonymized data using only 15 demographic attributes (age, 
gender, marital status, etc.). Montjoye suggests that there is a 
need to shift the paradigm of de-identification: “We need to 
de-identify, then move on. Anonymity is not a property of 
the data set, it depends on how the person who writes it uses 
it.” In other words, what matters is not anonymizing the data 
set but designing and organizing the data set that matters 
most. 
So what are the alternatives? It is time to move from the 
idea of de-identification to the application of appropriate 
technologies/  It is to strike a balance between the use of data 
and personal privacy. Technologies such as secure multiparty 
computation and homomorphic encryption are emerging. 
More innovations are certainly in progress in post-COVID-
19 world of new big data technologies and ICT applications 
[30, 31]. 
The development of these new technologies will increase 
our choice options when dealing with infectious diseases. In 
the epidemic prevention and control, there is no doubt that 
personal information collected in epidemiological 
investigations is for public safety purpose. There is no real 
disagreement that personal information collected should be 
protected from privacy infringement. It is imperative to  
balance personal privacy and public safety even in the 
context of COVID-19. Personal information collected under 
the consent of the individual may be used for overcoming 
this pandemic and achieving related research purposes.  
Initially, encrypted or unidentified personal information may 
be used, and in a pandemic situation, original personal 
information may be used. Of course, personal consent is 
essential whenever the collected personal information is used. 
COVID-19 is a testing case for the debate between personal 
privacy and public safety.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In essence, the public disclosure  of personal information is 
not absolutely required to epidemiological investigations of 
rapidly spreading epidemics. In COVID-19, the Korean 
government actively used personal information using ICT 
and demonstrated fairly successful outcomes in pandemic 
control. However, that is  only a part of the whole story. ICT 
usage patterns imply that the more convenient it is to use for 
effective control of pandemic, the easier it is to infringe 
personal privacy. For the proper use of personal information 
in the fight against infectious diseases, consent to personal 
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information is essential, and de-identified personal 
information must be used. The future research may explore 
further how de-identification technologies such as noise-
based de-identification technologies are developed and 
applied. The rightful use of big data should make our lives 
safe, secure and free-balancing personal privacy and public 
safety. 
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